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Abstract 
Derk Pereboom's four-case manipulation argument has proved to be a major point of 
contention between compatibilism and hard incompatibilism in the debate over causal 
determinism's alleged threat to free will and moral responsibility.  Notably, the four-case 
argument has met Michael Mckenna's so called hard-line reply, a six-case argument modeled 
after Pereboom’s four-case one and intended to establish a dialectical stalemate between the 
compatibilist and incompatibilist positions on largely intuitive grounds.  Mckenna contends that 
his six-case argument elicits compatibilistically friendly intuitions about Pereboom’s case 1 in 
which the agent is said to be morally responsible. I argue that Mckenna's hard-line reply does not 
succeed in demonstrating this alleged stalemate between the two debating sides. The current state 
of the dispute can be so characterized only if the opposing sides' reported intuitions enjoy 
evidential equivalence. But, I argue, the evidential credentials of these intuitions are not 
equivalent. The newly elicited intuition from Mckenna’s six-case argument cannot be assumed to 
do any evidential work without a good explanation of why it cannot be a commanding intuition. I 
argue that Mckenna's proposed explanation is not adequate as it stands. Finally, I offer a 
diagnosis of the origins of the apparent dialectical impasse, and, on this basis, seek to advance 
the debate on novel grounds. I defend the four-case argument by locating the disagreement 
between the two sides in the particular application of the generalization method.  
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In Defense of the Four-Case Manipulation Argument for Hard Incompatibilism 
Krasimira Filcheva 
 
I. Introduction  
Derk Pereboom's four-case manipulation argument has proved to be a major point of 
contention between compatibilism and hard incompatibilism in the debate over causal 
determinism's alleged threat to free will and moral responsibility.  Notably, the four-case 
argument has met Michael Mckenna's so called hard-line reply, a six-case argument modeled 
after Pereboom’s four-case one and intended to establish a dialectical stalemate between the 
compatibilist and incompatibilist positions on largely intuitive grounds.  Mckenna contends that 
his six-case argument elicits compatibilistically friendly intuitions about Pereboom’s case 1 in 
which the agent is said to be morally responsible.  He thus seeks to demonstrate that the 
incompatibilist enjoys no theoretical advantage over the compatibilist. According to Mckenna, 
the debate seems to have reached a dialectical impasse, given that both positions report equally 
legitimate but conflicting intuitions about Pereboom's case 1. 
In what follows, I argue that Mckenna's hard-line reply does not succeed in demonstrating 
this alleged stalemate between the two debating sides.  The current state of the dispute can be so 
characterized only if the opposing sides' reported intuitions enjoy evidential equivalence.  But, I 
argue, the evidential credentials of these intuitions are not equivalent.  The newly elicited 
intuition from Mckenna’s six-case argument cannot be assumed to do any evidential work 
without a good explanation of why it cannot be a commanding intuition. I argue that Mckenna's 
proposed explanation is not adequate as it stands.  In the second part of the paper, I offer a 
suggestion on how to advance the debate over the four-case argument on novel grounds.  
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The Four-Case Manipulation Argument    
 
Pereboom’s argument attempts to show that there is no principled moral distinction 
between cases in which agents are causally determined to perform a given action and cases in 
which they are manipulated into performing the same action in a responsibility-undermining 
way.  The argument seeks to elicit the intuition that causally determined agents are not morally 
responsible by way of a carefully crafted generalization strategy.  It comprises a series of three 
manipulation cases in which an agent performs a morally objectionable action and ends with a 
fourth case in which regular causal processes lead to the performance of the same action.  Here, 
the intuitive response to the first case, that the agent is not morally responsible, is supposed to 
generalize to the second one.  Pereboom has structured the cases in such a way that there are, 
arguably, no morally relevant differences between them.  The generalization strategy is then used 
for the second and third cases and, importantly, the third and fourth one, an uncontroversially 
natural case in which the agent's action is determined by the past and the laws of nature 
(Pereboom 93-8).  
It is important to stress that, in constructing his four cases, Pereboom has incorporated all 
prominent compatibilist conditions that are usually taken to be sufficient for an action to be free 
– reasons-responsiveness, receptivity to moral reasons, the presence of second-order desires, etc.  
In other words, what Michael Mckenna refers to as the Compatibilist-friendly Agential Structure, 
CAS (142), is supposed to be as prominent as the relevant causal factors – manipulation and 
natural causal processes – in all four cases.  The following, then, is a brief presentation of the 
cases. 
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In Pereboom's case 1, the manipulation is local. Sophisticated neuroscientists manipulate 
Plum from moment to moment by radio-technology so that he is causally determined to kill Ms. 
White, but in such a way that the compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility are met.  Plum 
acts on the basis of his non-alienating desires and stable character without being constrained to 
act.  His action thus fits the conditions for responsibility proposed by Hume (Hume 1739/1978, 
319-412; Pereboom 94).  His second-order desires are such that he wills his egoistic first-order 
desire to kill Ms. White and wants to act on the basis of it, thereby satisfying Frankfurt’s 
condition for agent responsibility (Frankfurt 1971; Pereboom 94).  Plum is also reasons-
responsive in that he would be willing to refrain from killing Ms. White were he to regard the 
consequences as too costly (Fischer and Ravizza 69-82; Pereboom 94).  His patterns of moral 
deliberation also conform to the responsibility conditions advanced by Jay Wallace.  Plum is 
capable of guiding his behavior on the basis of moral reasons, which is evidenced by his 
tendency to give such reasons considerable weight when egoistic motives are not strong enough.  
He is also capable of subjecting his behavior to revision over time (Wallace 51-83; Pereboom 
94).  
 In a second scenario, Plum is programmed by the neuroscientists from the beginning of 
his life so that his character develops in accordance with egoistic motivations that culminate in 
his killing Ms. White.  The compatibilist agential structure necessary for moral responsibility is 
preserved as Plum appears to be just like any ordinary agent.  In the third scenario, Plum is 
determined to kill Ms. White by the rigorous psychological conditioning of his community over 
which he has no control.  But, the hard incompatibilist tells us, the difference between this and 
the previous scenario is just that the manipulation is more ordinary in this case.  That is hardly a 
principled ground on which to distinguish between the cases and hold Plum responsible in the 
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third one.  Non-responsibility thus generalizes.  In Case 4, Plum is an ordinary agent in our 
natural world, causally determined to kill White by the past and the laws of nature but in such a 
way that his action conforms to the compatibilist conditions for responsibility.  Since there seems 
to be no good explanation of why Plum may be thought responsible in the last scenario but not in 
the third, the incompatibilist concludes that this is just to say that Plum is not morally responsible 
for his action even when it is produced by normal causally deterministic processes (Pereboom 
94-8).   
Here, the judgment that manipulated Plum is not morally responsible in case 1, based on 
a widely shared and strong intuition, is conjoined with Pereboom's generalization strategy 
mentioned above to elicit the same judgment in the ordinary case 4.  The success of the 
incompatibilist argument thus depends in large measure on the original intuition that manipulated 
Plum in case 1 is clearly not morally responsible.  If the compatibilist can elicit a different 
intuition to counteract the one reported by Pereboom, then the argumentative force of the four-
case argument can seem dispelled.  This line of reply is precisely the one employed by Mckenna.  
 
Michael Mckenna's  “Hard-Line” Reply 1
 
 
 Proceeding in a reverse way, from a sixth case involving regular deterministic processes 
to Pereboom's case 1 and applying Pereboom's own generalization strategy, Mckenna argues in 
the following way.  Since the incompatibilist cannot assume that determinism undermines moral 
responsibility, he or she cannot deny that the agent is free and morally responsible in Mckenna's 
normal case 6 (modeled after Pereboom's case 4).  Here, Mckenna makes only the modest 
assertion that it is not the case that the agent is clearly not morally responsible in his case 6.  If 
                                                 
1 In what follows, I base my comments on Mckenna (2008).  
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the latter intuitive reaction attends case 6, then, given that Mckenna, similarly to Pereboom, has 
structured his cases in such a way that no morally relevant difference seems to apply to them, 
nothing prevents the intuitive reaction from generalizing to the remaining cases up to Pereboom's 
case 1 (Mckenna 153-54).  The strategy Mckenna uses in reaching the intuitive result that it is 
not evident that Plum is not morally responsible in case 1 is to draw attention to the rich 
contingent of compatibilist agential factors in case 6.  By fixing our attention on these factors, 
Mckenna then imports them in the remaining cases up to Perebom's case 1. (152). 
Mckenna concludes that it is not the case that prof. Plum in case 1 is clearly not morally 
responsible – a seemingly counterintuitive result, avoided by most compatibilists and 
incompatibilists alike, which gives Mckenna's argument its hard-line title.  Moreover, Mckenna 
contends, his use of the generalization strategy against the four-case argument needs to elicit 
only the indecisive intuition that it is not clearly the case that Plum is not morally responsible in 
case 1.  This would suffice to disable Pereboom's challenge to the compatibilist, for then it 
cannot be concluded, by way of generalizing from his case 1, that the normal case 4 is one in 
which it is clearly the case that Plum is not morally responsible  (Mckenna 155).   
It is in this sense that Mckenna's hard-line reply is supposed to establish the dialectical 
impasse between the two debating sides (Mckenna 154).  The two conflicting intuitions about 
Plum's responsibility in case 1 are considered equally legitimate grounds for judgment.  The 
lesson that Mckenna draws from the presence of this intuitive deadlock is that it amounts to a 
victory for the compatibilist since “she was only out to defeat an argument for incompatibilism 
and not to prove her compatibilist thesis” (154).  Henceforth, I will assume that people can have 
the intuition that Mckenna seeks to elicit and investigate whether it can indeed be a part of the 
 
 
10 
 
intuitive evidence in the debate over the four-case argument.2
The indecisive intuition that it is not clear that Plum is not morally responsible in case 1, 
however, cannot be automatically taken as intuitive evidence, which one is to weigh against the 
opposing intuition elicited by Pereboom.  The hard-line compatibilist should presumably take the 
indecisive intuition in question to misrepresent the fact of the matter in case 1 since by his own 
lights Plum is clearly morally responsible.  According to the hard-line compatibilist, a 
commanding intuition that Plum is clearly morally responsible would be most appropriate.  In 
the absence of some explanation of why the intuition that Mckenna can elicit is only an 
indecisive one, it is open to the hard incompatibilist to insist that this opposing intuition is a 
single-case aberration, an inexplicable oddity.  Why should it be trusted with any evidential force 
if the hard-line compatibilist herself is bound to note that this intuition does not get the fact about 
Plum's responsibility straight?   
 
In his own discussion on the subject in a 2008 paper, Mckenna offers a seemingly natural 
explanation of why proper concentration of our attention on all the satisfied agential conditions 
for moral responsibility is still not powerful enough to provoke the opposite intuition that Plum 
just is morally responsible.  He offers the following considerations.  The fact that our responses 
to manipulation cases are tested in an extremely different context – one that significantly differs 
from the contexts of ordinary practice out of which intuitions have evolved – explains why they 
are not commanding enough in the cases proposed by Pereboom (Mckenna 157).  
Mckenna supports this assertion by highlighting some of our favorable reactions to more 
ordinary cases of manipulation which we encounter in daily life.  He asks us to consider the case 
of a young child, Ann, who witnesses the slow deterioration of her mother's health, and 
                                                 
2 I have not presented the specifics of Mckenna’s six cases since I just assume in the discussion to follow that 
Mckenna can successfully elicit the intuition about case 1 which he needs.  Limitation of space prevents me from 
doing justice to a full presentation of his cases. 
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ultimately, her death from leukemia.  We are to suppose that Ann is of such tender age that her 
reasoning is not mature.  Her early experience leaves an irremediable mark on her subsequent 
development so that she comes to see life as precious but limited – so vulnerable that it needs to 
be lived to its fullest.  Later on, as a mature adult, Ann regards her experience as a real-life 
manipulation case – it is just that it is not manipulation by foreign agents but by the vagaries of 
life.  Here, Ann's deeply entrenched values in life trace back to that decisive moment in her past 
when her mother was extremely sick.  Moreover, she does not see that as an impediment to her 
freedom and responsibility but as a condition for it.  Mckenna maintains that we should also 
regard it as such (156).  
In essence, the case of Ann, construed as ordinary, real-life manipulation, is seen as a 
testament to our general ability to intuitively react to cases of manipulation in a favorable way.  
But if ordinary contexts of evaluation allow us to issue such judgments about cases of 
manipulation, then we can justifiably maintain that the salient difference between evaluative 
contexts (bizarre, thought-experimental ones vs. natural ones) is what ultimately explains the 
intuitive resistance to regarding Plum as clearly morally responsible in case 1. This seems to be 
Mckenna's argument.  
 
II. Mckenna's Proposed Explanation: An Appraisal 
 
Let us concede that there could, in principle, be some such real-life manipulation cases in 
which our responsibility-ascriptions are decisive.  In other words, let us concede that we can still 
judge agents morally responsible for their actions even when they are manipulated in some more 
ordinary ways, by the vagaries of life, say.  Does this suffice to establish the plausibility of 
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Mckenna's explanatory hypothesis?  I believe there are strong considerations that go against it.  
Notice that his explanation of why our intuitions about moral responsibility are not commanding 
enough in extra-ordinary manipulation cases like Pereboom's assumes the following general 
form.  Context A has provided all background conditions for the evolution and development of 
intuitions of type X.  Context B significantly differs from context A.  So if intuitions of type X 
are not as commanding in context B as in context A, given that all responsibility-relevant 
conditions are present in both contexts, it must be the case that the difference between A and B 
explains the indecisiveness of the intuitions.  Because such an explanation assumes this general 
form, one would expect that it is applicable to structurally similar cases in which intuitions in the 
realm of moral responsibility are probed in vastly different contexts. This is not so, however. 
Mckenna's explanation falters when applied to the Frankfurt-style examples.3
Frankfurt-style examples famously involve much the same non-ordinary contexts for the 
testing of our reactions as do Pereboom's cases.  However, no parallel skepticism about how 
commanding the intuitions elicited from Frankfurt-style examples can be, given the non-natural 
features of the situations, seems to apply here.  In other words, no indecisive intuitions seem to 
be reported in these Frankfurt-style examples.  It is not common, for example, to have the 
intuition that it is not clearly the case that Black is not morally responsible for killing Jones.  
Rather, these are usually quite decisive (which explains why PAP has more or less faded from 
prominence recently). It appears that the nature of the context – thought-experimental vs. a more 
natural one – does not preclude the generation of strong, decisive reactions in the latter cases.  
 
One immediate objection calls for attention.  It may not be clear that there is the 
necessary structural similarity between the two types of cases, which one can use to discredit 
                                                 
3 Harry Frankfurt introduces his famous examples in “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” The 
Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 829-39.  
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Mckenna's explanatory hypothesis.  For if we notice the particular details of these examples, a 
relevant difference in the function of the featured causal factors may well render the cases 
insufficiently alike.  In a typical Frankfurt-style example it is the agent whose moral 
responsibility is probed that is assumed to be the most immediate causal origin of the action.  
The causal manipulation factor in Frankfurt-style examples is never embedded in the actual 
sequence of events but remains in the alternate sequence of events.  The agent whose moral 
responsibility is tested in the imaginary cases is not manipulated in the actual sequence of events.  
It is not so with Pereboom's examples.  
Here, one can attempt to explain away the decisiveness of the intuition that agents are 
morally responsible even if unable to do otherwise, which is the response to typical Frankfurt-
style examples. Our intuitions, as the envisioned response has it, are commanding enough in 
Frankfurt-style examples, despite the unnatural contexts in which these are elicited, because the 
most unnatural features of these contexts, the causal manipulation factors, are not as directly 
relevant to our intuitions about the case. These unnatural features are, in a sense, only 
background characteristics of the case.  This is because the causal manipulation factors are not 
embedded in the actual sequence of events that leads to the agent’s action.  The unnatural 
evaluative contexts of Frankfurt-style examples do not interfere with our normal intuitive 
responses because these contexts' most eccentric features, the causal manipulation ones, do not 
so interfere with our intuitions.  
Note, however, what the foregoing explanation implies for Pereboom's cases. Mckenna's 
original proposal for an explanation of why his newly elicited intuition about case 1 can only be 
an indecisive one has to be somewhat modified.  It will not only be the case that the mere 
unnaturalness of the evaluative context explains the indecisiveness of the intuition that it is not 
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clear that Plum is not morally responsible.  According to the modified proposal, the features of 
the context that are most unnatural directly interfere with our normal intuitive responses.  This 
would be what ultimately explains why our intuitions are wavering with respect to case 1.  But 
let us ask, what is the prominent, most eccentric or unnatural feature of Pereboom's case 1?  
Presumably, this is the causal factor, Plum's manipulation by neuroscientists.  This is the factor 
that we characterized as the background, non-obstructive one in the Frankfurt-style examples - 
that is, non-obstructive for our normal intuitive responses.  We should stress, then, that on the 
present proposal the indecisiveness of the intuition that Mckenna reports can be best explained 
by the presence of this unnatural causal factor, which interferes with one's normal intuitive 
responses and, arguably, obstructs one's proper attention to the relevant agential factors.  
What is problematic about the Mckenna's modified explanatory hypothesis is that it 
cannot provide any account of why the exact same configuration of agential and causal factors in 
case 1 – the neuroscientists' manipulation of Plum and the rich compatibilist agency conditions 
for moral responsibility – generates a very different response in incompatibilists and soft 
compatibilists alike.4
                                                 
4     Soft-line compatibilism denotes the position that gives the so called soft-line reply to the four-case argument. 
This kind of reply is, for example, given by Al Mele who in fact seeks to affirm the intuition reported by 
Pereboom (that Plum is clearly not morally responsible when manipulated in case 1) but give it an alternative 
explanation. One common compatibilist response to the case is that the presence of manipulation, rather than 
causal determination, is what explains the non-responsibility intuition. See Mele’s “Free Will and Luck: Reply to 
Critics,” Philosophical Explorations Vol. 10, No 2, (2007) p. 202-206. 
  Their reaction is, in effect, that the example is one of clear non-
responsibility.  The presence of unnatural contextual factors of the causal variety, Plum's 
manipulation by neuroscientists, construed as those unnatural features of the context that 
interfere with normal intuitive responses, is supposed to explain the indecisiveness of Mckenna's 
considered intuition.  But why is it that precisely these same obstructionist causal factors do not 
so interfere with other compatibilists' clearly opposing intuitions that Plum just is not responsible 
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for murdering Ms. White in case 1?   
In sum, we have a bad dilemma.  If we accept Mckenna's original explanation, according 
to which the difference in unnatural vs. ordinary contexts of evaluation explains the 
indecisiveness of the intuition, we will have to arbitrarily restrict its scope so that it does not 
apply to Frankfurt-style examples, despite the similarity between the cases.  If, on the other hand, 
we accept what seems to be the only plausible way to modify Mckenna's original proposal in 
response to that difficulty, we will not be able to account for why most compatibilists' intuitions 
are decisive and not obstructed by the presence of any unnatural causal manipulation factors in 
the case.  
However, there is one way in which one could escape the foregoing dilemma. It is open 
to the compatibilist to consistently reject any theoretical use of unusual evaluative contexts, 
including the ones featured in Frankfurt-style examples.  Such a compatibilist position might 
claim support from the ordinary practice of responsibility-ascription as it has evolved in our 
communal life.  According to this position then, we should limit our attention to the patterns of 
evaluative judgment that are elicited from ordinary language use.5
There are at least two main difficulties with such a position.  First, it might have to 
assume that the apparent lack of uniformity and coherence in people's ordinary responsibility-
ascriptions can be addressed without any resort to more unusual examples.  But there is good 
reason to doubt that this could be accomplished.  It is widely acknowledged that when people are 
faced with causal-historical considerations of no extra-ordinary variety they often retract their 
initial intuitive charges.  Early-childhood manipulation and harsh living conditions which might 
  The lesson to draw from 
Mckenna's indecisive intuition is precisely that unusual evaluative contexts are unreliable guides 
to people's fundamental views on moral responsibility.  
                                                 
5  This reply was suggested to me by Gordon Barnes.  
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incline individuals toward criminal behavior usually make people reconsider their initial intuitive 
reactions and make them more lenient toward such individuals.  But even when the causal-
historical factors are not of such a prominent sort, people still seem less inclined to judge others 
when they know more about the evolution of their character and behavior rather than about some 
small time-slice of others' lives.  It is of course debatable whether all this favors an 
incompatibilist interpretation of these patterns of ordinary thought.  It could be the case that the 
causal-historical factors in question just affect people's judgment as to whether the proper 
agential conditions of responsibility such as reason-responsiveness, rational self-control, etc. 
actually obtain in these cases.  A bad personal history might make a bad compatibilist agential 
structure.  
The point here is that the role of unusual evaluative contexts like the ones featured in the 
four-case argument is precisely to make both agential and causal-historical factors equally 
prominent and hence test which ones prevail in people's judgments.  One could thus have some 
hope of sorting through the multitude of considerations that might determine how people respond 
to cases in ordinary contexts.  It is hard to see how one can consistently reject the use of atypical 
evaluative contexts and be able to discern solely through people's patterns of responses in 
ordinary language whether their intuitions are ultimately compatibilist or incompatibilist in 
nature.  This is because ordinary ascriptions of responsibility seem to be of a mixed character. 
What is needed is “controlled” settings, which in turn require unusual circumstances.  
There is another difficulty with the rejection of atypical evaluative contexts, however.  
The incompatibilist can rightly insist that the evolution of our practice of responsibility-
ascriptions could be biased against any reflective consideration of causal factors.  After all, the 
demands of a successful communal life might have been such that the members of a given 
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community were more concerned with controlling the moral character of the other members than 
anything else.  This could have been served best if the practice of responsibility-ascriptions 
emphasized the presence of agential traits such as rational self-control, receptivity to moral 
reasons, etc.  Hence a restriction to merely ordinary contexts is bound to favor agential 
compatibilist considerations.  This should be seen as objectionable since the incompatibilist can 
rightfully maintain that when people's judgments are not interfered with by the pressure of 
custom, people can be properly sensitive to causal-deterministic factors.  In fact, the idea of the 
four-case argument is precisely to make these factors salient so as to bring about that sensitivity 
(Pereboom 100).  Restricting the relevant test cases to the ordinary ones does not give a fair 
hearing to the incompatibilist position.  
I take it that no convincing explanation of why we can only have indecisive intuitions 
about manipulation cases like Pereboom’s case 1 seems forthcoming. In the absence of such an 
explanation, the evidential force of Mckenna’s newly elicited intuition, in particular, seems 
substantially undermined.  One cannot automatically assume that Mckenna's indecisive intuition 
can counterbalance the commanding intuition of incompatibilists and soft-line compatibilists just 
in virtue of its availability. The hard-line compatibilist has to acknowledge that the indecisive 
intuition that it is not clear that Plum is not morally responsible misrepresents the truth of the 
matter in case 1 since by the hard-line compatibilist's lights Plum is clearly morally responsible.  
In the absence of any good explanation of why one cannot have a commanding intuitive response 
to that effect, given that such a response would be most appropriate, the intuition cannot do the 
evidential work that the hard-line compatibilist needs it to do.  
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III. Dialectical Burdens 
 
In the preceding section, I defended two central claims. I argued that the hard-line 
compatibilist cannot assume that the newly elicited indecisive intuition about Pereboom’s case 1 
does any evidential work without a proper explanation of why it is merely an indecisive one. I 
further argued that Mckenna’s proposed explanation is inadequate as it stands. In the absence of 
any positive support for her reliance on this intuition in countering the four-case argument, the 
hard-line compatibilist cannot successfully answer the challenge posed by the argument.  
However, there is one last difficulty in accepting the foregoing conclusion that we need to 
attend to.  This difficulty pertains to matters of dialectical burdens. It might be objected, in light 
of some of Mckenna’s other remarks, that I have not made a sufficiently good case for the 
demand that the indecisive intuition be given an explanation. My requirement for such an 
explanation can be seen as ill-founded because the hard-line compatibilist in the face of Mckenna 
has discharged his dialectical duty, so to speak, simply in virtue of eliciting a contrary intuition 
about case 1. All that is needed in order to counter Pereboom’s argument is that one demonstrate 
the weaker claim that it is not clearly the case that Plum is not morally responsible in case 1. The 
incompatibilist is the one who advances the claim that “appropriately manipulated agents” are 
not morally responsible. She is the one who started the confrontation, as it were. Thus, according 
to Mckenna, the compatibilist’s dialectical burden is a comparatively lighter one. He only needs 
to demonstrate that this is not clearly the case, which he does, in Pereboom’s case 1, by eliciting 
an indecisive intuition to that effect. As Mckenna puts it, “If the compatibilist can merely cast 
doubt on the incompatibilist’s positive claim, then she has adequately replied to the argument 
even if she has not offered a positive defense of her thesis regarding manipulation” [italics in 
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original] (Mckenna 155).  
Mckenna’s thesis is that an agent who is manipulated in such a way that CAS is satisfied 
is free and morally responsible. As he makes it clear, he does not intend to prove this thesis. In 
line with his remarks on the matter of dialectical burdens, he has assumed that he only needs to 
demonstrate that a properly manipulated agent like Plum is not clearly absolved from moral 
responsibility. This is achieved by garnering contrary intuitive evidence. But if this is the case, 
then our demand that he offer some explanatory account of his newly elicited intuition about case 
1, on pain of leaving it evidentially suspect, will seem illegitimate. It presupposes that the burden 
of proof is on the hard-line compatibilist’s side. True, to provide an explanation of why people’s 
intuitions cannot commandingly attest to the responsibility of properly manipulated agents, even 
though this would be the most appropriate judgment, according to hard-line compatibilism, is not 
to provide a positive argument for the latter position. It is, nevertheless, tantamount to offering 
some defense of the thesis that manipulated agents who satisfy CAS just are free and morally 
responsible. For a possible explanatory account of our wavering intuitions in cases like 
Pereboom’s case 1 will help to deflect a readily available criticism of Mckenna’s thesis, namely 
that people’s intuitive reactions do not seem to conform to that thesis. Accordingly, our demand 
for an explanation of the indecisiveness of Mckenna’s newly elicited intuition amounts to a 
demand that Mckenna offer some positive defense of his thesis, in some broad sense of defense. 
Yet, Mckenna contends that the hard-line compatibilist has discharged his dialectical duty. We 
seem to be facing a difficulty. What should we say about the matter of dialectical burdens in this 
case? Is it sufficient for Mckenna to simply elicit an opposing intuition about case 1 in order to 
counter the four-case argument, contrary to what I have been arguing in the preceding chapter?  
The best way to approach these questions is to examine Mckenna's grounds for 
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maintaining that his six-case argument has shifted the burden of proof to the incompatibilist's 
side. As already noted, Mckenna claims that the compatibilist's dialectical burden is 
“comparatively lighter” than the incompatibilist's. What Mckenna's somewhat cursory remarks 
suggest is that he takes the fact that the incompatibilist is the one advancing a manipulation 
argument to be a sufficient reason to counter his argument without invoking any considerations 
in support of his own hard-line position. Merely eliciting the opposing intuition that Plum is not 
clearly absolved from moral responsibility should thus suffice for shifting the burden of proof 
back to the other side.  
This should not satisfy us. If the above exhausts Mckenna's reasons for claiming a 
discharged dialectical duty, then it is markedly inadequate. Arguably, judgments about dialectical 
burden should be sensitive not just to balance sheet considerations, who started which argument, 
as Mckenna seems to assume. Rather, the nature of the arguments and claims being advanced 
should surely be weighed in the determination of argumentative burden. In particular, it seems 
that one ought to consider how much of commonsensical thought hangs on the truth or falsity of 
the claims in question. How revisionary are they with respect to widely accepted belief in the 
domain under consideration? What other beliefs do they bear on and in what way? Such 
considerations about a given claim's content, whether pragmatic or theoretical, are surely 
relevant to how much argumentative support ought to be mustered for this claim.  
 One plausible line of thought from some of the epistemological literature is that the 
justificatory status of a belief should reflect how much care a believer has taken to attend to the 
evidence for and against her belief. Arguably, how much or how little evidence ought to be 
attended to will depend on how much hangs on that belief, i.e. on the consequences of adopting 
the belief in question. Simon Blackburn has articulated the thought particularly well: “An 
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interesting consequence of this account [Blackburn's own position on reasonable belief] is that 
whether it is reasonable to have confidence in a proposition may sometimes depend upon what 
we are going to do with that confidence...For if the consequences of our having misplaced 
confidence in a proposition are anticipated to be rather serious, then it may be unreasonable for 
us to fail to collect evidence, which in a less serious situation, it might have been reasonable to 
fail to collect” (Blackburn 36). 
 In other words, our judgment about how much evidential support a given belief warrants 
seems to be rightly sensitive to the consequences of holding that belief. In the case of theoretical 
belief, these consequences will be determined by, among other things, the content of that belief, 
that is how much it forces changes elsewhere in the relevant doxastic system. These 
consequences will thus determine how revisionary (if at all) this belief happens to be with 
respect to the larger doxastic system in which it is featured. This is a plausible thought. It seems 
that the wider the influence of a given belief on others, especially in forcing changes, the greater 
the evidential support that is required to count as reasonably holding that belief.  
If the reasonableness of beliefs partially depends on how much evidential support one has 
for these beliefs, and if the necessary support is sensitive to considerations about how much 
hangs on these beliefs, then it seems we have some reason to extend these considerations to our 
present case. The success of the hard-line compatibilist’s effort to discharge his dialectical duty 
will not depend merely on his ability to gather opposing intuitive evidence to bear on Pereboom's 
case 1. Rather, the nature of the conclusion of his six-case argument will have to be weighed in 
the calculation of argumentative burden. If this conclusion has a widely counter-intuitive, 
revisionary character, then Mckenna cannot assume his task to be accomplished simply in 
producing this negative argument.  
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How much positive evidential support (if any) the conclusion of Mckenna's his six-case 
argument needs will depend on its conservativeness or lack thereof. If such a contention seems 
contestable, then we might relativize the conservativeness in question to the framework of 
ordinary compatibilism. If, in order to counter Pereboom's four-case argument, Mckenna finds 
himself endorsing a conclusion that seems too revisionary by most compatibilist's own lights, 
then this conclusion had better receive some positive support, in the broad sense that I have 
already noted. Furthermore, and this is the key claim here, if the above is correct, then Mckenna 
cannot assume to have shifted the burden of proof to the incompatibilist side simply in virtue of 
producing some counter-intuitive evidence that supports an especially revisionary conclusion.  
That the conclusion of Mckenna's six-case argument is revisionary seems hardly 
disputable. Recall that Mckenna claims to have countered Pereboom's four-case argument by 
using the generalization method to establish the conclusion that it is not clear that Plum is not 
morally responsible in case 1. Given that Plum is the quintessentially manipulated agent who the 
majority of compatibilists do not deem morally responsible, Mckenna's conclusion breaches a 
central commitment of compatibilism. This is the familiar commitment that the absence of 
manipulation in the causal production of a given action is a necessary condition for being 
responsible for that action. To assert even the weaker claim that it is not clear that an agent like 
Plum is not morally responsible is already to be making a revisionary claim in light of 
compatibilism's own theoretical framework. The consequences of accepting Mckenna's 
conclusion for compatibilism in general are quite serious for they force a significant modification 
of traditional compatibilism.  
Furthermore, Mckenna seems to be sensitive to the revisionary nature of his conclusion 
for he immediately goes on to soften its effect by trying to tell a story about ordinary judgment in 
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cases of familiar manipulation. This is where his presentation of the story about Ann enters into 
his argument. Mckenna thus gives the impression that he is concerned to place his counter-
intuitive conclusion in a better context, that is, to stress that it may not be as radical a departure 
from the ordinary practice of responsibility-ascription as it may first appear. He seems to be well 
aware of the theoretical pressures toward conformity to a standard of conservativeness.  
It is important to notice what is not being argued here. The foregoing considerations do 
not target Mckenna's claim that the hard-line compatibilist need not prove his general thesis 
about agents manipulated in an appropriate way in order to effectively respond to the four-case 
argument. This could be granted for the sake of argument. Yet, the weaker conclusion of his six-
case argument does need some positive defense in light of its revisionary nature, if the 
compatibilist is to discharge his dialectical duty. As already noted, the demand for such a defense 
here takes the form of an expectation for an explanatory account. Mckenna needs to provide 
some explanation of the indecisiveness of the opposing intuition about Pereboom's case 1 in 
order to forestall an immediate objection one may have to it, namely that it is an aberration that 
we ought not to take into consideration. It is easy to see that this objection is motivated by the 
counter-intuitive and thus revisionary nature of Mckenna's conclusion, which he bases on this 
indecisive intuitive evidence. In this respect, the main thrust of our discussion so far has been 
that matters of dialectical burden are not to be decided without proper sensitivity to the nature of 
Mckenna's conclusion. 
It seems that the only way that one can resist the force if these considerations will be to 
argue that even if a positive defense of the counter-intuitive conclusion of the six-case argument 
is needed, it is not needed for the purposes of answering the incompatibilist challenge in the 
debate over the four-case argument. One might maintain that offering such a positive defense is 
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optional. It may be required to address the concerns of fellow compatibilists but it remains a 
separate issue that does not need to be resolved in order to counter the four-case argument, 
nonetheless. There is a danger here that such a line of thought will license a questionable general 
policy for answering the criticism of one's opponents. Whenever an argument is being advanced 
against one's position, one might counter it by endorsing some deeply counter-intuitive and 
revisionary conclusion, championing the cause of hard-line responses, and relegating the positive 
defense of it to other occasions. In such a case, the defense of one's claims will not be owed to 
the opponent but to one's in-group.  
In the debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism in which all sides are typically 
concerned with mustering intuitive support for their claims, getting away with hard-line 
responses may not be a good policy to recommend. It seems that these ought to be held to a high 
standard of warrant. This is especially relevant to our present concern with the matter of 
dialectical burdens. Shifting the burden of proof to the other side so easily, without allowing the 
nature of one's conclusion to be weighed into the calculation and distribution of argumentative 
responsibility, is surely a sign of leniency. We should not be satisfied with the hard-line 
compatibilist's grounds for rejecting demands for some positive support of his conclusion. 
However, if these remarks do not seem convincing, then we could even grant that for the 
purposes of answering the four-case argument Mckenna does not need to provide a positive 
defense of his conclusion. Yet, given its revisionary nature, we are free to insist that it 
immediately generates a burden of proof on the part of the hard-line compatibilist so that we are 
still owed some defense of his indecisive conclusion. The dialectical burden is not on the side of 
the hard incompatibilist, however we decide to frame the issue. I take it that this suffices to make 
the case that our demand for some explanatory support of Mckenna's conclusion is not 
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unjustified.  In light of the arguments from the previous section, this demand has not been met.  
 
IV. A Diagnosis 
 
 Yet, one could still harbor some concerns about the general state of the debate that 
emerges from the success of Mckenna's generalization strategy.  Even if the indecisive intuition 
that Mckenna elicits does not carry evidential force, there is still the fact that Mckenna can elicit 
this opposing intuition. What are we to make of this fact?  We are assuming that Mckenna can 
successfully elicit a conflicting intuition about Pereboom's case 1 using the very same method of 
generalization that Pereboom uses. Mckenna's starting point, his normal sixth case, featuring an 
agent who is determined by the past and the laws of nature, is different than Pereboom's starting 
point, case 1.  What might be seen as puzzling here is that one's different starting point, whether 
it will be a clear-cut manipulation case like Pereboom's case 1 or Mckenna's ordinary case 6, 
together with a pressure toward generalization, can yield different intuitive results.  Perhaps, 
what really needs to be explained here is the role of the starting point from which one 
generalizes.  Moreover, this would appear to be more of a general problem for both theoretical 
positions than merely a problem for the compatibilist or incompatibilist side.  
The compatibilist would presumably maintain that a normal scenario like Pereboom's 
fourth one, in which natural deterministic processes lead to Plum's murder of Ms. White, is 
bound to yield a different intuitive response in ordinary circumstances, that is, outside the 
context of the other four cases that Pereboom presents.  The compatibilist is likely to insist that 
in ordinary circumstances people will unwaveringly judge Plum to be morally responsible in 
case 4.  Arguably, the compatibilist should also allow that at least some ordinary people might 
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have conflicting intuitions about case 4 when they are initially subject to Pereboom's 
generalization method.  To suppose otherwise might be to have an unreasonable level of 
confidence in ordinary people's judgments by taking them to be unwavering through and 
through.  So I take it that it should be puzzling even for the compatibilist how a different starting 
point together with generalization pressures can alter people's intuitive responses to a single case.  
Notice that, in light of our previous discussion, one cannot simply resort to the distorting 
influences of unnatural contexts in explaining away people's conflicting intuitions.  In other 
words, one cannot argue that it is not really the influence of the variable directions of 
generalization pressures from distinct starting points that yields the different intuitive results in 
the examples at hand but these other distorting influences.  Furthermore, it is not open to the 
compatibilist and incompatibilist alike to give an alternative explanation that cites the disparate 
influence of causal-historical and agential factors on people's reactions to the starting-point and 
end-point cases.  It has already been emphasized that both kinds of factors are taken to be equally 
prominent in all cases.  There seems to be at least a prima facie case for demanding a distinct 
explanation of the role that the starting points in series of cases play in people's different intuitive 
responses.  
In order to give a possible account of the mechanism that gives rise to conflicting 
intuitions in the debate over the four-case argument it may be instructive to first consider the role 
of consistency pressures on responsibility-ascriptions.  One's particular evaluation of the first 
case in a given series already generates some pressure to give a similar evaluation to the second 
one if no responsibility-relevant difference seems evident.  This pressure is then carried over to 
the remaining cases.  How might such an observation help with explaining why single cases like 
Pereboom's first and last one can yield different intuitive results depending on whether the case 
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considered first is a normal one or a clear-cut manipulation case?  
One possibility here is that consistency pressures simply have different directions 
depending on the starting point in question.  What gives rise to the consistency pressures is the 
theorist's deliberate construction of a series of cases in which the members do not seem to differ 
in any responsibility-relevant way.  If one is presented with a normal case featuring naturalistic 
determination, for example, on the condition that the successive cases in the series seem to 
feature the same compatibilist-friendly agential structure, then the pressure to be consistent with 
one's initial intuitive judgment in the normal case might lead one to waver on the clear-cut 
manipulation case.  Conversely, if one is first presented with a clear-cut manipulation case and 
subsequently with a series of cases that do not seem to differ with respect to the causal-
deterministic factors featured in them, then one might feel the pressure to be consistent with 
one's initial intuitive reaction to the clear-cut manipulation case.  Given that most people will 
have an especially firm judgment that the manipulated agent is not morally responsible and given 
that the direction of consistency pressures is different in this case, one might well end up more 
inclined to extend the same judgment to a normal case of naturalistic determination.  This 
mechanism may then allow one to make some progress in explaining the different intuitive 
results of Mckenna's and Pereboom's use of the generalization strategy. 
What emerges from the foregoing discussion is that the nature of the case that is 
considered first, whether it will be an ordinary one featuring regular deterministic processes or a 
clear-cut manipulation case, makes all the difference.  This is the sense in which the different 
direction of consistency pressures, which operate from a distinct starting point in one's 
evaluation of a series of cases, determines the conflicting intuitions that one ends up with.  
Perhaps the lesson to draw here is that not all starting points are equally reliable.  The debate 
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between the compatibilist and incompatibilist will then involve arguments to the effect that the 
opposing side's starting point is not a legitimate case from which to generalize.  
I have argued that the compatibilist cannot disqualify the incompatibilist's atypical 
manipulation cases as illegitimate on the grounds that they feature contexts that are too extra-
ordinary and so lead people's normal intuitions astray.  Nevertheless, it is open to the 
compatibilist to argue on some other grounds that clear-cut manipulation cases like Pereboom's 
case 1 are not reliable starting points in generalization arguments.  In a similar vein, it is open to 
the incompatibilist to argue that something about cases like Mckenna's sixth one and Pereboom's 
fourth one, which feature only naturally determined agents, makes them unreliable starting 
points.  The conflicting intuitions that the different starting points together with generalization 
pressures yield thus seem to reflect a general problem that arises from taking all cases to be 
equally reliable.  Perhaps, such an assumption will need to give way. 
The foregoing discussion is not intended as any definite account of what generates the 
puzzling state of the debate between the hard-line compatibilist and the incompatibilist.  Yet, if 
progress is to be made beyond the purported dialectical stalemate between the two debating 
sides, then it seems that one ought to consider the full scope of possible explanations of the 
particular mechanism that operates when people make responsibility-ascriptions.  People's 
intuitions seem particularly sensitive to whether a given case is evaluated first in a series of 
cases, in isolation from others, or last, in the end of a process of generalization.  Proper attention 
to such observations may enable one to advance the debate by locating the disagreement between 
the two sides in the particular application of generalization strategies.  What kind of cases are to 
serve as reliable starting points from which to generalize?  What are the criteria on which one is 
to judge what makes a case good for the purpose?   These questions are worth exploring as they 
 
 
29 
 
may allow one to make some progress in the debate over the four-case argument.  
 
                V. Advancing the Debate 
 
In chapter four, I argued that proper sensitivity to the conflicting results yielded by the 
use of the generalization method in the debate over the four-case argument should lead us to a 
certain conclusion. I suggested that the lesson to draw from the current state of the debate is that 
not all kinds of responsibility-relevant cases should be treated as equally reliable starting points 
in our evaluation of a series of examples. In light of these developments, I maintain that the 
disagreement between the compatibilist and incompatibilist should be located in the particular 
application of the generalization strategy. In order to advance the debate we should thus focus on 
Mckenna and Pereboom's starting points – ordinary causal-deterministic cases versus causal-
manipulation cases. Does the hard incompatibilist have any reason to criticize the use of 
Mckenna's ordinary causal-deterministic example as a starting point for evaluating the series of 
cases leading to Pereboom's case 1? Does she have any good argument to the effect that the 
generalization strategy needs to be confined to the kind of use she puts it to, namely a 
generalization of intuitive results from manipulation cases?  
The central contention of this chapter is that the hard incompatibilist does have serious 
grounds on which to object to Mckenna's use of ordinary causal-deterministic examples as 
starting points from which to generalize. The discussion to follow is one extended argument for 
this claim. If I am correct in what argue, then the threat posed by Mckenna's hard-line response 
to the four-case argument stands effectively annulled as this response depends on the legitimacy 
of the starting point from which he generalizes.  
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There are at least two kinds of objections that one might have to the hard-line 
compatibilist's use of the generalization strategy – methodological and more substantive ones. I 
will first address the former kind. One immediate objection that one can levy against the six-case 
argument is that it takes as its starting point the sort of case that is bound to evoke different 
intuitive reactions on the part of the compatibilists, on the one hand, and incompatibilists, on the 
other. But if the generalization method has proved to yield conflicting results about Pereboom's 
case 1, depending on whether this case is evaluated first in isolation from the other ones or last 
after Mckenna's other cases, then we seem to have reason for putting greater confidence in the 
less divisive case, namely Pereboom's case 1.  
We have abandoned the assumption that all starting points are equally reliable in light of 
such conflicting results. The natural reaction seems to be to put greater confidence in the starting 
point case that manages to generate more agreement in the intuitive judgments of those who 
evaluate it. Cases featuring regular causal-deterministic processes like Mckenna's sixth one are 
hardly ones that generate such agreement. In contrast, the strength of Pereboom's argumentative 
strategy seems to lie precisely in the choice of a starting point case that generates agreement 
between incompatibilists and most compatibilists alike. The presence of causal manipulation 
factors is intended to make the compatibilist agree with the judgment that Plum is not morally 
responsible in case 1. The incompatibilist presents an example from which to generalize that is 
by and large not divisive. It is thus open to the hard incompatibilist to argue that Mckenna's sixth 
case is comparatively more divisive than Pereboom's case and thus ought not to serve as a 
starting point from which to generalize. Given that both sides are now forced to have a more 
discriminatory approach to the use of the generalization strategy, in light of our preceding 
arguments, the most straightforward criterion for discrimination is surely how much antecedent 
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and broad intuitive force a given case can marshal.  
As plausible as this initial argument may be, it is unlikely to be sufficiently persuasive to 
the hard-line compatibilist.  Mckenna may after all insist that he has a perfectly good justification 
for relying on a comparatively more divisive case to start off the generalization process.  This is 
the already familiar thought that he is only responding to an argument and hence not out to 
convince his opponent to adopt his own position.  The requirement that one start with the kind of 
responsibility-relevant example that can marshal the intuitive support even of one's opponents is 
appropriate only in the event that one is advancing a positive argument that has as its purpose to 
convince others.  The function of Mckenna's own six-case argument is not to convince the 
incompatibilist that it is not clear that properly manipulated agents are not morally responsible. 
The imposition of a requirement that this sixth case have a level of intuitive support comparable 
to that of Pereboom's case 1 is entirely illegitimate. But then the fact that the sixth case generates 
less intuitive agreement is not to be invoked as a ground for discriminating against it.  If 
Mckenna's application of the generalization strategy is to be cogently criticized, then the feature 
that renders Mckenna's sixth case a less reliable and objectionable starting point must be sought 
elsewhere.  
In light of these considerations, which may or may not be conclusive, the hard 
incompatibilist should instead seek a more secure ground on which to disqualify Mckenna's sixth 
case as a reliable input for the generalization mechanism. The hard incompatibilist needs a more 
substantive argument for this purpose. The difficulty in offering such an argument is especially 
compounded by the fact that Mckenna's sixth case is so structured as to feature both agential and 
causal factors. The natural deterministic causes operating in Plum's decision to kill Ms. White are 
in fact brought to the surface. This makes the following tempting line of thought powerless to 
 
 
32 
 
support the rejection of normal cases as starting points. Initially, one may be tempted to say that 
natural, manipulation-free cases cannot reliably serve as inputs to the generalization process 
because they are representative of the vast majority of cases which people encounter in everyday 
life. Crucially, these are cases in which people are not generally aware of the causes of their 
actions. Any application of the generalization method to such scenarios is thus bound to be 
objectionable to the hard-incompatibilist. Yet, as already noted, Mckenna's sixth case evades this 
possible criticism since it features the deterministic causes operative in the agent's decision to 
kill.  
The possibilities for a successful argument on the part of the hard incompatibilist seem to 
be significantly circumscribed. Moreover, since the hard incompatibilist has traditionally relied 
on the Spinozistic intuition that our illusion of freedom is maintained by an ignorance of causes 
and that this illusion would be dispelled if we were aware of these cause (Pereboom 2005; 
Mckenna 2008), a special difficulty emerges for her argument. Not only will it seem that normal, 
manipulation-free cases can be reliable starting points but it will also seem that the Spinozistic 
intuition can thereby be substantially weakened. If, as we have been assuming for the purposes 
of this paper, people can share Mckenna's indecisive intuition about his sixth case, despite the 
clear presence of the deterministic causes behind Plum's action, then the Spinozistic intuition 
seems to be ineffective in generating incompatibilist sympathies. More importantly, the 
traditional reliance on this Spinozistic intuition happens to operate against the incompatibilist in 
the present case as it creates the expectation that people would in fact have the appropriate 
incompatibilist intuition about Mckenna sixth case so that there could be no good objection to 
using this case as input to the generalization process.  Pointedly, it is the incompatibilist's 
confidence in our ability to be properly sensitive to the revelations of the ultimate Spinozistic 
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perspective that creates the most difficulty for advancing an argument against Mckenna's 
application of the generalization strategy. 
What grounds for rejecting Mckenna's manipulation-free case are then left to the 
incompatibilist? 
This can become clear only after she draws the correct lesson from the failure of the Spinozistic 
intuition to support her present case.  The hard incompatibilist ought not to have placed such 
high confidence in the Spinozistic suggestion in the first place. The thought that our illusion of 
freedom would be dispelled if we became aware of the causes of our actions because it is 
ignorance of these causes that maintains it should preserve an important place in incompatibilist 
theorizing. I do not intend to challenge that. Yet, the mistake that the incompatibilist has made, 
manifested in her present failure to resist Mckenna's application of the generalization method, is 
not to recognize the limitations of that thought. It should be acknowledged that mere awareness 
of the causes of our actions may not suffice to incline the majority of us to react in an 
incompatibilistically-friendly way. This is because ignorance of causes is unlikely to be the 
central basis for people's illusion of freedom, though it admittedly has a significant role to play in 
maintaining this illusion. Once it is recognized that other powerful factors generate this illusion, 
which are, moreover, operative in our responsibility-ascriptions in normal, manipulation-free 
cases like Mckenna's sixth one, it should become clear why the incompatibilist can reject these 
latter cases as unreliable starting points.  
            I suggest that the enduring force of the illusion of freedom does not stem primarily from 
ignorance of the causes of our actions but from the nature of the deliberative standpoint essential 
to the exercise of agency. Following insightful remarks by F.P. Ramsey on the critical role of the 
deliberative standpoint in causal reasoning (Ramsey 146), I want to suggest that the very nature 
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of our deliberative standpoint is the main source of the potentially wavering response people may 
have to ordinary manipulation-free cases, even when the ultimate causes of action in these cases 
are prominently displayed. If this is indeed the case, then the hard incompatibilist will be able to 
explain why it is still possible for some people not to have the clear incompatibilist intuition to 
Mckenna's sixth case, when the latter is evaluated first, despite the presence of deterministic 
causes in the case.  
On this view, the illusion of freedom is inescapably embedded in the deliberative 
standpoint and it will be implausible to expect that it can be so easily dispelled when people 
become aware of the ultimate deterministic causes of their actions. By extension, it will be 
implausible to expect that an awareness of the natural deterministic causes of others' actions will 
also easily and universally incline people to unwavering incompatibilist sympathies. There are 
bound to be great pressures to sustain the illusion of freedom.  The incompatibilist will thus have 
some good grounds to resist the use of ordinary cases as starting points in in the application of a 
generalization strategy. It is only by introducing manipulation factors, which can highlight the 
real import of deterministic causation, that one can hope to truly test the intuitions of people. The 
generalization method should first be applied to cases that allow people to resist the 
overwhelming pressures to maintain the illusion of freedom. The rejection of ordinary cases as 
unreliable will be justified in terms of their inability to counterbalance the inherently strong 
pressure to imagine our actions as “an ultimate contingency.” Otherwise, the incompatibilist side 
will not have received its fair hearing.  
            Ramsey's key insight is that the basics of causal reasoning emerge from the deliberative 
standpoint: “Again from the situation when we are deliberating seems to me to arise the general 
difference of cause and effect” (Ramsey 146). It is from the perspective of our own agency that 
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we understand the concepts of cause and effect. But given such a fundamental relation between 
causal reasoning and the deliberative standpoint, one would expect that certain characteristics of 
this standpoint will have an essential impact on one's understanding of the causes of one's own 
action. This is precisely what Ramsey's remarks further reveal: “In a sense my present action is 
an ultimate and the only ultimate contingency” (ibid.). Now, one should resist the implied claim 
that no contingency in the action of others is recognized. For, barring skepticism about the inner 
life of others, it seems that whatever feeling of contingency in action one may feel from one's 
own deliberative perspective, one will thereby transfer in the evaluation of others' actions. But if 
that is the case, then it seems that it is integral to the normal exercise of agency and recognition 
of others as agents that one recognize the ultimate contingency in one's actions and the actions of 
others.  
Furthermore, it becomes clear that any expectation that this belief in ultimate freedom 
should be universally and easily dispelled once the deterministic causes of others' action are 
revealed is ill-founded. One would expect, on the contrary, that such a fundamental belief, 
constitutive of the deliberative standpoint and thus the very nature of causal reasoning (if 
Ramsey is to be trusted on this score) should be hard to counteract. Given this difficulty, the hard 
incompatibilist already has the rudiments of a case against the reliance on ordinary cases as 
starting points from which to generalize. For these will not be sufficiently removed from the 
familiar background against which ordinary causal reasoning operates and thus biases one 
towards a presumption of ultimate contingency in action.  
As already intimated, one's evaluation of a given agent, who is assumed to engage in 
relevantly similar deliberative processes as one engages in, is constrained by the presumption of 
“contingency.” This presumption is the centerpiece of our ordinary conception of agency, which 
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informs our common interaction with others. It stands to reason that such a presumption ought to 
be counterbalanced for the purposes of probing the hard incompatibilist case against moral 
responsibility. The key claim then is this. The introduction of manipulation in the causal 
production of Plum's action can accomplish an essential task for the fair evaluation of Plum's 
responsibility in Pereboom's case 4. The essential task is to remove any biased tendency toward a 
compatibilist evaluation of normal agents that is, crucially, a product of the ordinary pressures to 
attribute contingency to the actions of others just in virtue of their being deliberating agents like 
us.  This residual source of pressure, inherent in our conception of agency, needs to be 
counteracted. The incompatibilist can thus insist that if one chooses to generalize from normal 
cases, then one thereby allows these pressures to unfairly bias one's intuitions against the 
incompatibilist. The presence of manipulation, on the other hand, can make the presence of 
causal determinism stark enough so as to act against these pressures so the 
compatibilist/incompatibilist case can be judged in abstraction from these pressures. Therefore, 
Mckenna's ordinary sixth case ought to be rejected as a starting point of generalization.  
Now the hard-line compatibilist might still insist that there is no good reason to dismiss 
the presence of natural deterministic causes in Mckenna's sixth case as inadequate for the task of 
removing whatever fundamental pressures to maintain an alleged illusion of freedom people 
might to be subject to. Wouldn't highlighting the deterministic causes of Plum's action in the 
sixth case undermine these pressures if people were indeed incompatibilists at heart? Contrary to 
what has been said so far, it might seem reasonable to suppose that the causal factors featured in 
Mckenna's case can do the job. But the incompatibilist is bound to disagree.  One should not 
expect that mere awareness of deterministic causes can act against such a deeply ingrained 
presumption of contingency in action implicated in our very conception of agency.  For it is quite 
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evident in the common practice of responsibility-ascription that even after individuals soften 
their reactive attitudes in response to increased knowledge of the causes behind others' actions, 
they do not completely absolve them of responsibility. It is common to encounter individuals 
who readily enumerate all the conditioning that criminals have undergone in their childhood, the 
harsh life conditions, abuse, neglect, etc. that these criminals have been subject to and still 
respond after all that “they were nonetheless responsible.”  
Notice that this does not necessarily testify against incompatibilism as such reactions are 
hardly a universal phenomenon. However, what they do show, according to the incompatibilist, 
is that it is unlikely that mere ignorance of causes fosters the illusion of freedom. One cannot 
expect that even after becoming aware of these causes individuals will completely abandon the 
illusion of freedom for its source is a deeply ingrained presumption of contingency in action 
which is integral to our common conception of agency.  Given such a fundamental source, the 
incompatibilist ought to insist that normal cases like Mckenna's are unlikely to fairly address the 
need for counteracting this presumption in order to give the incompatibilist side a hearing.  
Conclusion 
I have argued that the alleged dialectical stalemate between the hard incompatibilist and 
compatibilist sides in the debate over the four-case argument does not in fact hold. Michael 
Mckenna’s hard-line reply does not succeed in countering the intuitive evidence garnered from 
the argument. I have further offered a diagnosis of the current state of the dispute between the 
two theoretical positions. Variable directions of consistency pressures in the divergent 
application of the generalization method have led to opposing intuitive results in the four-case 
and six-case arguments. I have argued that the debate can be advanced once the particular 
application of the generalization method becomes the locus of disagreement between the two 
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sides. On this basis, I have offered an argument in favor of the hard incompatibilist use of the 
generalization method, which is supposed to vindicate the four-case argument.  
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